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Abstract 
It has been 27 years since the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was passed in the United Kingdom in response to advances 
in fertility treatment. Preimplantation genetic diagnosis - the screening of embryos for genetic diseases - has led to lengthy ethical de-
bates on sex selection, eugenics, disabilities, saviour siblings, surplus embryos and most recently, adult-onset diseases (the BRCA cancer 
gene). This article provides an overview of how the law and practice of PGD in the United Kingdom and United States over the last 
quarter of a century has developed into new ‘branches’ of PGD, and predicts where they may be heading in the future. It concludes that 
many of the adverse views on PGD are unfounded and that some of these unique branches may develop to accommodate the screening 
of additional social traits. An underlying conflict between reproductive autonomy and a right to an open future is also rising under the 
surface to be noted for the future.
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, Eugenics, Disabilities, Saviour Siblings.Keywords:
When a team of scientists announced in 1989 that Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) was taking place on embryos, no one 
could have foreseen its potential.  The procedure itself is high-
ly complex - the embryo created in vitro is biopsied and one or 
two blastomeres (cells) are removed to be screened for the pres-
ence of a genetic disease. Originally developed as an experimen-
tal procedure at the Reproductive Genetics Institute in Chicago, 
Illinois to screen for X-linked diseases during fertility treatment, 
PGD quickly gathered pace when the first birth was announced 
in 1992.  PGD was expanded further to detect late-onset diseases 
with a genetic predisposition such as breast cancer following the 
discovery of the BRCA gene, discovered in 1994.  A controversial 
development came in 2001 when screening for a human leukocyte 
antigen (HLA) tissue match allowed couples to select an embryo 
to be a blood or bone marrow donor to an existing child, referred 
to as preimplantation tissue typing (PTT). 
PGD can now detect hundreds of genetic diseases. The Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority in the United Kingdom is 
currently licenced to screen for over 250 conditions.  However, 
the ethical debates surrounding PGD are a constant reminder of 
the strain between reproductive autonomy (i.e. couples should be 
able to choose their embryos based on whatever genetic criteria 
they want) and the right to an open future (i.e. the child should not 
be born against a ‘design’).  Where is the line drawn in regards to 
ensuring that our children are born with or without certain traits, 
characteristics and disorders? This article briefly overviews the 
main ‘branches’ that have stemmed from PGD over the last 25 
years including: social sex selection, the selection of disabilities, 
saviour siblings and the screening of adult-onset diseases, to clar-
ify how the UK and US law has developed and where, in light of 
the ethical debates on eugenics and surplus embryos, PGD may be 
heading in the future.
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Legal Develop-
ment In The Uk And USA
The United Kingdom
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was passed 
on 1st November 1990, setting up the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority (HFE Authority) under section 5. The 1990 
Act was the first in the world to place embryonic research on a 
statutory footing and contains intricate licencing laws. PGD is now 
found under schedule 2:
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence cannot authorise the testing of an em-
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bryo, except for one or more of the following purposes:
(a) establishing whether the embryo has a gene, chromosome or 
mitochondrial abnormality that may affect its capacity to result in 
a live birth;
(b) in a case where there is a particular risk that the embryo may 
have a gene, chromosome or mitochondrion abnormality, estab-
lishing whether it has that abnormality or any other gene, chromo-
some or mitochondrion abnormality.
(2) A licence cannot authorise the testing of embryos for the pur-
pose mentioned in sub-paragraph (1)(b) unless the Authority is 
satisfied:
(a) in relation to the abnormality of which there is a particular risk, 
and
(b) in relation to any other abnormality for which testing is to be 
authorised under sub-paragraph (1)(b), that there is a significant 
risk that a person with the abnormality will have or develop a se-
rious physical or mental disability, a serious illness or any other 
serious medical condition. 
The 1990 Act (as amended) comes with a lengthy Code of Practice 
to help with interpretation and is available on the official web-
site.  The HFE Authority also regularly publish national trends 
and figures on fertility treatment. The current picture in the United 
Kingdom, 25 years after the passing of the 1990 Act, states the 
following:
• In 2014, 52,288 women had 67,708 cycles of IVF treatment;
• In 2014, 2,511 women had 4,675 cycles of donor insemination;
• 22 clinics provided PGD for 594 IVF cycles in 2014, with a birth 
rate of 25.6%;
• Donor sperm was used in 2,691 of IVF cycles in 2014;
• Donor eggs were used in 1,866 of IVF cycles in 2014;
• A grand total of 84,720 embryos were transferred in 2014;
•  28,263 pregnancies were reported in 2013-2014 following IVF 
treatment;
• The pregnancy rate has increased from 34.6% in 2012 to 36.3% 
in 2014;
• The live birth rate has increased from 25.4% in 2011 to 26.5% 
in 2013;
• The frozen embryo live birth rate has increased from 19.9% in 
2011 to 24.8% in 2013;
• 1285 cycles of IVF were performed on same-sex female couples;
• It is estimated that 2.2% of babies born in the UK in 2013 were 
IVF babies. 
The UK approach to fertility treatment thus consists of a regula-
tory body, a complex statute, strict licencing provisions and a de-
tailed Code of Practice, and has inspired other countries to follow 
suit. PGD has advanced differently in the United States because of 
its research quality.
The United States
In the United States, there are no laws in place at a national level 
to regulate fertility treatment. The Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) does not require premarket approval for PGD because it is 
considered ‘research’.  The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Cer-
tification Act 1992 requires fertility clinics across the country to 
report pregnancy rates to the Centre for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, but this excludes pregnancies using PGD. It is therefore 
left to advisory bodies to guide embryologists on what is accept-
able practice in the field. The American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine (ASRM) was founded in 1944 as a non-profit organisa-
tion to support reproductive medicine in the U.S. and members 
now include biologists, embryologists, gynaecologists, urologists, 
reproductive endocrinologists, mental health professionals, inter-
nists, nurses, practice administrators, laboratory technicians, pae-
diatricians and research scientists (membership is voluntary).  
The ASRM publishes guidelines for correct laboratory procedures 
to ensure that member clinics adhere to the same high standards 
of practice.  A laboratory director oversees his own embryology 
lab and is in charge of key performance indicators such as success 
rates, quality control programs, policy and procedure manuals for 
safety, infection, disaster, insurance, chemicals, personnel, patient 
identification, specimen collection, preservation, transportation, 
processing and reporting of results.  In addition, the Society for 
Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) recommends that the 
laboratory director must ensure that if his clinic is registered with 
SART and has a SART number, that the highest standards of qual-
ity, safety and patient care in assisted reproductive technology are 
met.  90% of assisted reproductive technology clinics in the U.S. 
are members of SART, and insurance companies only provide cov-
erage for SART member clinics.  
What is interesting about the U.S. approach to fertility treatment 
is now laissez-faire it is. For example, there is no formal definition 
of an ‘embryologist’ but a suggested definition put forward by the 
ASRM is “trained and certified by the laboratory director to per-
form all or most of the laboratory’s embryology procedures”.  A 
clinic must be registered, accredited and certified at national level 
and report fertility cycles to the Centre for Disease Control and 
Prevention by law (excluding PGD), but membership to the ASRM 
and SART is voluntary. It is therefore up to the patient to do their 
research, pay the money and take the risks. This is in stark contrast 
to the United Kingdom, where every element of fertility treatment 
is subject to strict licencing conditions and statutory definitions.
Annual fertility treatment statistics are published by SART and as 
of September 2015 the current picture in the United States was as 
follows:
• Of the 101,600 treatment cycles that were carried out in 2014:
o 48.6% resulted in live births for patients under 35;
o 16.1% resulted in live births for patients over 40;
o Thawed embryos were used in 33,383 cycles;
o Donor eggs were used in 9,961 cycles. 
The International Picture.
PGD has not been welcomed in every developed country. Its link 
to eugenics (i.e. eradicating diseased or disabled embryos to pro-
duce ‘perfect’ human beings) means it is banned in Chile, Switzer-
land, China, the Ivory Coast, the Philippines, Algeria, Ireland and 
Austria. Germany only recently changed the law in 2011 to allow 
PGD in cases with a very high risk of genetic disease, stillbirth or 
miscarriage. PGD is offered in Canada, Hungary, Italy, Norway, 
Demark, India, South Africa, Ukraine, France, Australia (South & 
Victoria), the Netherlands, China, Israel and Japan. Regulations 
are difficult to obtain in some of these countries because of the 
language barrier and a tendency to leave it up to individual States 
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to regulate the practice.  In Canada for example, the Assisted Hu-
man Reproduction Act 2004 was repealed in 2012 leaving each 
province to regulate fertility treatment at its own discretion. Que-
bec, Alberta and Manitoba have chosen to publically fund fertility 
treatment with clear regulation and numerous clinics, whereas On-
tario has no clear regulation and only a few private clinics.  There 
are other countries such as Finland and Portugal where no laws 
have been passed but discussion is ongoing. Patients in these coun-
tries usually have to travel abroad. 
The growing availability of PGD worldwide has led to an increas-
ing number of clinics offering its controversial ‘branches’ (i.e. so-
cial sex selection, preference of disabled embryos, saviour siblings 
and adult-onset diseases). The ethical discussions surrounding 
these unique developments shed some light on where PGD may be 
heading in the future.
PGD and Sex Selection
PGD was originally designed to locate cystic fibrosis in female 
embryos before implantation.  The technology has now expanded 
to include other X-linked diseases such as Huntington’s chorea, 
duchenne muscular dystrophy, spinal muscular dystrophy, fragile 
X syndrome, haemophilia, myotonic dystrophy, beta-thalassemia 
and sickle cell anaemia. These genetic diseases cause significant 
disability, a very low quality of life and premature death, allowing 
couples to select male embryos using PGD. 
The sex selection of embryos for purely social reasons has not 
been received so favourably. PGD for social sex selection is illegal 
in the United Kingdom, Canada, Taiwan, Denmark, India, Germa-
ny, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine (1997) states that: “the use of techniques 
of medically assisted procreation shall not be allowed for the pur-
pose of choosing a future child’s sex, except where serious he-
reditary sex-related disease is to be avoided” under article 14 but 
Germany, Ireland, Italy and the United Kingdom did not ratify the 
convention.  This places the legality of social sex selection in a 
strange position.
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryol-
ogy Authority has spent considerable time researching the issue 
of social sex selection. A report entitled, Sex Selection: Options 
for Regulation (2002) was published after a brief consultation and 
concluded that sex selection should only be offered to couples who 
are seeking to avoid X-linked diseases or disorders: 
A great many respondents felt that sex selection was unqualifiedly 
wrong because it involved interference with divine will or with 
what they saw as the intrinsically virtuous course of nature. Many 
of those who used these arguments used them to express a pro-
found concern that human intervention in reproduction to achieve 
specific goals might result in unintended and undesirable side ef-
fects. 
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (the ‘amend-
ing’ Act) was passed a few years later restricting sex selection to 
gender-related conditions under schedule 2 paragraph 1ZB.  It 
seems a little strange to prohibit social sex selection on the grounds 
that it poses an interference with “divine will” when the very na-
ture of assisted reproductive technology takes the conception out 
of the hands of nature. In future, it is possible that the United King-
dom may relax the 1990 Act to allow for families with two or more 
boys, for example, to select a female embryo in the name of family 
balancing. 
In the United States, no legislation exists to govern the controver-
sial branches of PGD but the American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine has commented on the advantages and disadvantages of 
social sex selection and concluded in a posted opinion that each 
clinic may use its discretion.  Advantages include patient auton-
omy, reproductive liberty and family balancing. Disadvantages 
include unknown long term risks of assisted reproductive tech-
nologies, pressure from a partner, disrespect for embryos, public 
opposition, conditional acceptance from parents, a ‘slippery slope’ 
to other traits, denying the child an open future, imposition of 
gender norms, psychiatric harm to the child, potential disruption 
to the parent-child relationship and gender imbalances in society. 
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists has a 
stricter opinion in light of the United Nations International Confer-
ence on Population and Development (September 1994):
The committee shares the concern expressed by the United Na-
tions and the International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstet-
rics that sex selection can be motivated by and reinforce the deval-
uation of women. The committee supports the ethical principle of 
equality between the sexes…The committee concludes that the use 
of sex selection techniques for family balancing violates the norm 
of equality between the sexes; moreover, this ethical objection 
arises regardless of the timing of the selection (i.e. preconception 
or post conception) or the stage of development of the embryo or 
foetus. 
Commentators have focussed on the social implications of couples 
being able to choose the sex of their child rather than geographical 
imbalances: could it lead to some form of psychological harm? 
Seavilleklein and Sherwin, who oppose PGD for social sex selec-
tion, point out that gender does not always conform with social 
norms leading to disappointed parents:
What, we must ask, will be the response of parents who have gone 
to a great deal of time, trouble and expense to ensure a baby of a 
chosen gender if that child ends up failing to meet standard gender 
norms or rejects the prescribed gender identity entirely?…The as-
sumption that gender is easily characterised and reducible to sex 
is problematic for society in the sense that it may serve to make 
people in general less tolerant of diversity; this intolerance can 
have a significant impact on matters of social justice. Those who 
fall outside accepted gender norms [transsexuals, homosexuals, 
bisexuals, intersexuals and transvestites] are often stigmatised by 
virtue of this difference, which can to various degrees affect their 
self-worth, self-confidence, psychological stability, bodily com-
fort, personal safety, and personal relationships. 
Supporters of PGD for social sex selection prefer to focus on re-
productive autonomy and argue that the State should provide a 
good reason for interfering with this right.  In a rather unique view, 
Malpani compares social sex selection to choosing a spouse for 
their personal traits:
Their argument seems to be that it is acceptable to discriminate 
against children with birth defects (negative deselection) but it is 
not acceptable to select for certain desirable traits (positive selec-
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tion). I find this hard to understand, After all, the reason we select 
our spouses is that they have certain traits we place a premium on 
(intelligence or good looks) and we then hope that our children 
will inherit these qualities. Vive la difference. The best society is 
one where individuals have the freedom to decide their own course 
of action for themselves. 
We do see in our spouses what we see in ourselves and those of us 
who desire children hope that the positive traits in our spouses are 
carried forward into the next generation, but selecting a spouse for 
character traits is not quite the same as selecting an embryo for its 
sex. Gender carries with it a whole host of assumed characteristics, 
the absence of which can lead to a completely different child to the 
one ‘hoped for’.
PGD for social sex selection presents a clear example of the con-
flict between reproductive autonomy and the right to an open fu-
ture, because by selecting a female embryo (a parental right) the 
mother surely expects a feminine child (a closed future). A happy 
medium  would be to legislate for social sex selection for fami-
ly-balancing purposes with an ethics committee in place to enquire 
about gender assumptions within the family, protecting the pro-
spective child from supremacism, discrimination and ignorance.
Commentators have suggested that an overabundance of males in 
Western society could lead to an increase in prostitution, molesta-
tion and rape.  This is probably scaremongering - Baruch reports 
that 42% of IVF clinics in the United States have provided PGD 
for social sex selection and there have been no reports of gender 
imbalances in any State.  The gender imbalance in India and China 
is widely known, but caused by quite different reasons. There are 
approximately 50 million ‘missing’ women in these countries as a 
result of selective abortion (which has been illegal in India since 
1996) and infanticide.  These gender imbalances are not down to 
PGD but to deeply entrenched social and cultural attitudes which 
will take generations to change. The growth of the sex-selection 
branch of PGD is, therefore, difficult to forecast as a result of such 
varied international social norms.
Eugenics
Eugenics - from the Greek ‘eugenes’ (well born) and ‘genos’ (race) 
- means to improve the genetic quality of the human race through 
reproduction or science. PGD immediately raised concerns about 
eugenics because of its promise of a perfect birth. The Charter 
of Fundamental Rights, passed by the European Council in June 
1999, contains fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the 
EU and Article 3 of the Charter, the right to the integrity of the 
person, prohibits: “eugenic practices, in particular those aiming at 
the selection of persons”.  PGD is a eugenic practice in that it aims 
to create humans free of disease, but the Charter is not applicable 
to the UK or the US because it was not signed or implemented into 
national law, leaving the science to develop on its own. 
PGD has raised two eugenic concerns: the discrimination of dis-
abled people known as the ‘loss of support’ argument, and the po-
tential selection of social traits (such as hair colour, height, metab-
olism, sexuality, perfect pitch and intelligence) known as social 
eugenics. This is a concern for the future, but the technology is 
developing now. 
The first concern raised by commentators is that individuals with 
genetic diseases will lose support (research, funding, healthcare 
and compassion) for their genetic disease if fewer babies are born 
with the disease, as detailed by Gavaghan:
The most straightforward suggestion is that a reduction in the 
numbers (either absolutely or as a proportion of the population) of 
persons affected by particular conditions will reduce the perceived 
importance of finding cures, treatments, or ways to improve the 
lives of those remaining affected persons. As regular commen-
tator on disability issues Tom Shakespeare says: “as a condition 
becomes rarer, the impetus to discover a cure or treatment dimin-
ishes. This reinforces my wider feeling, that genetic screening will 
never be total, which means that the proportion of congenital im-
pairment may be reduced, but not eliminated, which means that 
disabled people will be further isolated, face increasing prejudice, 
and the pressure to make society accessible to all will be reduced.” 
It is probably an exaggeration to say that as a result of PGD sup-
port for people with genetic diseases would decrease because, as 
long as naturally-conceived babies are capable of being born with 
these serious ailments, there will be an impetus to treat them. Be-
sides, imagine if the diagnosis rate for cancer were to fall steadily 
by 10% every year as a result of embryonic screening for BRCA1 - 
would we stop screening for cancer in fear that sporadic adult cas-
es would lose support? Would we be discriminating against people 
who suffered from cancer by eliminating their disease from preim-
planted embryos? No - the statistics would be celebrated and spo-
radic cases would  have access to the same healthcare resources. 
Supporters of PGD prefer to focus on the reason why PGD was 
developed in the first place - to prevent genetic diseases (Lau and 
Jansen):
About 1000 children affected with cystic fibrosis are born annu-
ally in the US, in some part due to reluctance to terminate affect-
ed pregnancies. There is the potential to save 33 billion dollars in 
lifetime medical care for those affected with this disorder if carrier 
parents had the option of undergoing government-backed or in-
surance-mandated PGD and IVF. For couples who are carriers of 
severe inherited genetic disorders, prevention of affected pregnan-
cy by PGD may be a preferred option to the termination of affect-
ed foetuses. Thus, economic and medical considerations favour a 
universal and affordance access to IVF, PGD or PGS services for 
carrier couples of severe single-gene disorders such as CF, or for 
individuals at risk for transmitting chromosomal translocations but 
cannot afford it. 
It is widely accepted that the discarding of embryos is preferred 
to the termination of an established pregnancy. This was the main 
aim of PGD, as stated by Dr Yury Verlinsky who helped develop 
the practice:
Preimplantation genetic diagnosis has allowed hundreds of at-risk 
couples not only to avoid producing off-spring with genetic disor-
ders, but more importantly, to have unaffected healthy babies of 
their own without facing the risk of pregnancy termination after 
traditional prenatal diagnosis.  
It appears that the ‘loss of support’ argument is based on concerns 
of ostracism and has the potential to instigate a complete halt to 
PGD for fear of isolating people with genetic diseases. These con-
cerns are  unfounded. Abortions carried out in cases of disease 
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or disability do not appear to have caused a  ‘loss of support’ to 
sufferers  and they are more distressing to parents than embryonic 
disposal. 
The second concern raised by commentators is that of social eu-
genics. The House of Commons Science and Technology Com-
mittee in the United Kingdom published a report, Reproductive 
Technologies and the Law (2005) to explore the development of 
fertility treatment, and social genetics was clearly frowned upon 
by experts in the field:
The term “designer babies” is often employed to describe any 
child that has been born as a result of PGD, although in our view 
this term is highly misleading since they are no more designed 
than a child who has been born following a negative genetic test 
during pregnancy. Professor Alastair Campbell from the Universi-
ty of Bristol expresses similar sentiments: “we should view chil-
dren as gifts, not as products. On this basis, I argue against con-
ceptions and pregnancies using PND (pre-natal diagnosis) or PGD 
(preimplantation genetic diagnosis) when these are based on social 
reasons (gender, height, intelligence, physical appearance, etc.). 
These are all examples of treating the child not as a person in her 
own right, but as a product designed by parental wishes.” 
Professor Campbell raises an interesting point - if an embryo with 
blond hair, blue eyes, perfect pitch and a high metabolism is select-
ed out of a group of screened embryos, has it been “designed” by 
the parents?  It may be more accurate to say it is selected against a 
design, weakening the threat of ‘eugenics’ somewhat.
Caplan, in contrast, fails to see what is wrong with individual de-
signs when they are not part of a grand plan enforced by a State:
No moral principle seems to provide sufficient reason to condemn 
individual eugenic goals. While force, coercion, compulsion and 
threat have no place in procreative choice…it is not clear that it 
is any less ethical to allow parents to pick the eye colour of their 
child or to try and create a foetus with a propensity for mathemat-
ics than it is to permit them to teach their children the values of a 
particular religion, try to inculcate a love of sports by taking them 
to football game, or to require them to play the piano. In so far as 
coercion and force are absent and individual choice is allowed to 
hold sway, then…it is hard to see what exactly is wrong with par-
ents choosing to use genetic knowledge to improve the health and 
wellbeing of their offspring. 
Caplan suggests that selecting a talented embryo is the same as 
giving a child piano lessons, but it could be argued that the former 
child would have no choice in his pastime whereas the latter child 
could walk away from his pastime. The former child would also 
be expected to reach a certain level, whereas the latter child would 
achieve a certain level. It is clear that the use of PGD for social eu-
genics presents a strong conflict between reproductive autonomy 
(the right of the couple) and the right to an open future (the right 
of the child).
The ‘social eugenic’ branch of PGD is probably on the cusp of 
a boom. There is no doubt that social characteristics such as eye 
colour, hair colour and height will be discovered over the next few 
years if they are determined by DNA. The lack of law in the United 
States suggests that the boom will occur there, but there is no evi-
dence to suggest that should these social characteristics be offered 
to couples, a ‘superior race’ would begin to emerge or people with 
genetic diseases would be cast out into the cold. 
In future, the most coveted  characteristic yet to be found (and like-
ly to have a genetic link) is metabolism, presenting an alternative 
way of curbing the global obesity crisis in the West. The ethical 
debates upon the discovery of this gene would rage: knowledge 
of a high metabolism may encourage an even worse diet and it 
is a characteristic linked to beauty and attraction. It may be the 
beginning of a quest for eugenic perfection, making the need for 
international regulation particularly urgent.
Selecting for Disability
The ability to screen out an increasing number of genetic diseases 
has taken an unexpected turn: couples have been known to request 
a particular disability for implantation. These couples may be dis-
abled themselves and want a similarly disabled child to share their 
lives with, may already have a child with the disease and seek a 
matching sibling, or may genuinely want to care for a disabled 
child but rather than foster one, they would prefer their own. Neg-
ative dysgenics, as it is coined, is by far the most controversial 
development in assisted reproductive technology because couples 
are using PGD to select the diseases that the technology was de-
signed to avoid (Nunes):
…if two deaf people have the same autosomal recessive type (like 
DFNB1) only deaf children will be born. However, this situation is 
clearly different, both from a social and a professional ethics per-
spective, from the direct intervention of medicine and repro-genet-
ics to deliberately create a deaf child. The question then is how to 
balance reproductive autonomy with dysgenic practices…negative 
dysgenics can be obtained through careful prenatal or preimplanta-
tion selection and abortion (or discarding) of normal embryos and 
foetuses…this dysgenic practice could be regarded as unethical 
because individual rights - namely the right to an open future - are 
at stake. 
Dr Yury Verlinsky, who helped pioneer PGD, has refused requests 
for disabled embryos, stating: “if we make a diagnostic tool, the 
purpose is to avoid disease”.  The United Kingdom has ignored 
this advice. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
allows a mother to select a disabled embryo for implantation un-
der section 13(9) as long as she does not prefer it (i.e. she may 
select a healthy embryo alongside it), and if she can only produce 
defective embryos she may select any one of those.  The number 
of couples who may use PGD for this purpose is narrowed under 
the 1990 Act to carriers or suffers of a particular “disorder, defect 
or disability” under section 1ZA(1)(b). A healthy (non-carrying) 
couple can only screen for diseases that may “affect a live birth” 
under section 1ZA(1)(a). There is a welfare provision under sec-
tion 13(5) of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
which advises that  a woman shall not be provided with treatment 
services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child 
who may be born, but it is widely regarded as unenforceable.  The 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee Report 
on Reproductive Technologies and the Law (2005) added that: 
“in reality, this provision is more akin to a ‘fitness for parenting’ 
requirement, which was historically used to prevent certain ‘un-
desirable’ groups from parenting and is now widely rejected”.  It 
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appears quite shocking that in the United Kingdom there is no wel-
fare protection for disabled embryos selected for implantation. The 
child would have to be born and the genetic disease would have to 
manifest before the child could receive welfare protection under 
the Children Act 1989, which is outside the ambit of fertility law. 
There is no way of knowing how many women have sought PGD 
for a disabled embryo because, following a request for informa-
tion under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 as part of this 
research, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority re-
sponded that it does not keep statistical information on the implan-
tation of disabled embryos.  This loophole in embryonic welfare 
is rather worrying. 
The situation in the United States is shrouded in mystery. The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the Society for As-
sisted Reproductive Technology and the American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynaecologists have not published any guidelines 
or opinions on the implantation of disabled embryos or a suitable 
benchmark for embryo viability, giving clinics across the country 
carte blanch to select and implant disabled embryos at the request 
of patients. The lack of guidance may be because negative dysgen-
ics is rare or simply incomprehensible, but research suggests that 
it does happen. 3% of 190 PGD clinics across the United States 
have provided PGD to parents to select an embryo for a disability, 
a significant proportion of deaf parents would prefer to have deaf 
children,  at least one fertility clinic had complied with a request to 
select dwarfism because the trait ran in the family,  one IVF doctor 
refused a couple who asked for an embryo with Downs syndrome 
so they could give their affected child a similar sibling,  and pa-
tients with dwarfism are reported to be “strong-arming” physicians 
by threatening to become pregnant at another clinic, test for dwarf-
ism and abort any pregnancy not carrying the gene.  The most 
widely publicised case is that of Candace McCullough and Sharon 
Duchesneau, a deaf lesbian couple from Maryland, United States 
who sought a deaf sperm donor for use in artificial insemination 
and gave birth to two deaf children.  
Inevitably, the ethical issues under this branch of PGD have stirred 
commentators.  In an extreme example of support for negative 
dysgenics, Lane suggests that screening out deafness is tantamount 
to genocide:
[We should use genetic intervention] in order to enhance the pos-
sibility that deaf parents will have deaf children [because] it is un-
ethical for the majority culture to aim to reduce the numbers of 
children born deaf because measures intended to prevent births 
within a cultural group constitute genocide. 
Lane compares deafness to a culture, making it impossible to view 
PGD for deaf cases as anything other than genocide. This is an 
unhelpful approach, as couples should not be made to feel like 
criminals if they do not wish to have a disabled child. In contrast, 
Gavaghan points out that the rejection of a disabled embryo should 
not receive such stigma in light of social abortion:
Those who agree [that the decision to avoid the birth of disabled 
children constitutes a rejection of disabled people] must demon-
strate why a decision to avoid the birth of a disabled child sends 
an emotionally harmful message to existing people, whereas a de-
cision to avoid the birth of a child into difficult social or economic 
- as opposed to genetic - circumstances does not send an anal-
ogous message to poor families, large families, or families with 
very young mothers, all groups who are already to some extent the 
subjects of social stigma. 
Further research has supported this view. Kalfoglou found that 
eight providers of PGD were not supportive of negative dysgenics 
because it was “contrary to the goals of PGD” and one laboratory 
director said: “I would have a problem personally with participat-
ing in making sure a child was going to be handicapped”.  It is 
likely that the Hippocratic Oath plays a large role in the cautious 
views of some embryologists, but this may not be a bad thing. The 
vilification of parents who desire only healthy children is rather 
strange. 
The future in this branch of PGD is very uncertain, but the cur-
rent support for genetic diseases in society should not be mistaken 
for encouragement to create even more using the very technology 
that was designed to prevent them. It is under dispute whether the 
birth of an intentionally disabled child can amount to a criminal or 
civil action,  but a legal test case (brought by the child against the 
parents or embryologist) would see a fascinating conflict between 
patient autonomy, the perception of disability and the rights of the 
child. The result would surely be that the selection of a genetically 
diseased embryo resigns that child to a closed future at best, or 
subjects her to pain, exclusion and an early death at worst.  This 
branch of PGD, therefore, is the most at risk from criminal sanc-
tions in the not-too-distant future.
Saviour Siblings
A branch of PGD that has caused strong public opinion is screen-
ing embryos for a human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tissue match 
to cure an older sibling of a serious genetic disease (preimplan-
tation tissue typing or PTT).  Adam Nash became the first ever 
tissue matched sibling to be born at the Reproductive Genetics In-
stitute in Chicago, Illinois in 2001 when his umbilical cord blood 
successfully cured his older sister from fanconi anaemia. Dr Yury 
Verlinsky explained the advantages of the treatment in his report:
Although this is the first and only experience (to our knowledge) 
of PGD for HLA antigen testing, it provides a realistic option for 
couples desiring to avoid the birth of an affected child, together 
with the establishment of a healthy pregnancy, potentially provid-
ing an HLA antigen match for an affected sibling…These new in-
dications make PGD a genuine alternative to conventional prenatal 
diagnosis, providing patients with important prospects not only to 
avoid an inherited risk without facing termination of pregnancy, 
but also to establish a pregnancy with particular genetic parame-
ters that benefit an affected member of the family. 
This first successful birth in the United States sparked a major le-
gal development in the United Kingdom. Mr & Mrs Hashmi asked 
the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to issue a li-
cence for PTT resulting in the case of R (Quintavalle) v Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (and Secretary of State for 
Health) [2005] 2 A.C. 561. The House of Lords confirmed that 
the terms ‘suitability’, ‘treatment services’ and ‘assisting’ under 
the 1990 Act referred not to the viability of the embryo but the 
desires of the mother to have a tissue-matching child, making PTT 
available to the public on a case-by-case basis.  PTT is now also 
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available under schedule 2 paragraph 1ZA(1)(d) of the 1990 Act 
(as amended in 2008):
Schedule 2: Activities that may be licenced under the 1990 Act.
Paragraph 1ZA(1): A licence…cannot authorise the testing of an 
embryo, except for one or more of the following purposes:
(d) in a case where a person (“the sibling”) who is the child of the 
persons whose gametes are used to bring about the creation of the 
embryo (or of either of those persons) suffers from a serious medi-
cal condition which could be treated by umbilical cord blood stem 
cells, bone marrow or other tissue of any resulting child, establish-
ing whether the tissue of any resulting child would be compatible 
with that of the sibling.
The HFE Authority published a report, Preimplantation Tissue 
Typing (2004) to explain their decision to authorise licences for 
PTT, and a particular quote causes concern about commodifica-
tion: 
…should the existing child relapse, there is likely to be insufficient 
time to go through the process of creating a tissue-matched sibling. 
If such a sibling existed already, tissue that could be used in treat-
ment would then be at hand if and when required. 
The welfare provision under section 13(5) of the 1990 Act, which 
would have protected the embryo from commodification, has been 
shunned as unusable for saviour siblings too (in the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee Report on Repro-
ductive Technologies and the Law).  In light of the unworkability 
of section 13(5) and the fact that an embryo cannot be made a 
ward of court,  the only legal protection left for embryos selected 
for their HLA tissue match is the welfare provision under section 
1(3) of the Children Act 1989, which states: “the child’s welfare 
shall be the court’s paramount consideration”. This provision has 
never been used to support a saviour sibling before, nor has there 
ever been a child donation case in the UK.  This second loophole 
in embryonic welfare is also worrying.
The position on PTT in the United States is just as obscure. The 
American Society for Reproductive Medicine has not published 
any views on preimplantation tissue typing but, as in the UK, this 
is probably because bone marrow donation is outside of its remit. 
However, the common law regarding donations from children has 
made more progress, laying down a rigorous test in Curran v Bo-
sze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319 that requires the saviour sibling her-
self to glean a tangible psychological benefit from the donation 
(per Calvo J):
The psychological benefit is grounded firmly in the fact that the 
donor and recipient are known to each other as family. Only where 
there is an existing relationship between a healthy child and his 
or her ill sister or brother may a psychological benefit to the child 
from donating bone marrow to a sibling realistically be found to 
exist. 
It is possible for a child to glean an altruistic psychological benefit 
from a bone marrow donation, but it would have to be a sufficient-
ly mature child. A baby or toddler could not experience such a ben-
efit, meaning that their bone marrow harvest would be unlawful.  
Supporters of PTT often endorse the interfamilial principle, which 
uses a benefit to the wider family to justify the selection of a tissue 
matching embryo. Pennings provides a good example:
The relationship between the donor and recipient functions in an 
indirect way: it explains why the donor has an interest in the well-
being of the recipient. To the extent that the wellbeing of the others 
is part of one’s own wellbeing, the person is helping himself…
Since it is impossible to bring forward medical benefits in cases of 
organ or bone marrow donation, one concentrates on the psycho-
logical and social benefits for the donor as a consequence of his 
relationship with the recipient and/or other family members… The 
intervention can be justified even if it goes against the interests of 
the donor child…it can be argued that refusing this use would be 
an unacceptable neglect of the sick child’s interests…the donor is 
much too young to have any understanding of what is happening. 
They psychological effects will have become diluted by the time 
that the child is able to understand the action in which it took part. 
Moreover, it is very likely that the child will later agree (hypothet-
ical consent) with the decision his parents made for him for he will 
then have come to value his relationship with his sibling. 
Pennings makes a number of suggestions that require analysis. 
Firstly,  medical benefits are impossible to glean from a bone mar-
row donation,  rendering the procedure unlawful upon a child re-
gardless of a  familial/social benefit. Secondly,  going against the 
interests of the saviour sibling conflicts with the notion of para-
mountancy under section 1(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989 (UK) 
and the rights of the donor child under Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 
N.E.2d 1319 (US). Thirdly, the suggestion that the sick sibling is 
‘neglected’ implies that the saviour sibling is somehow obliged to 
treat the illness and is to blame if the sick sibling dies. Fourthly, 
the word ‘diluted’ suggests that the ignorance of the young saviour 
sibling would be taken advantage of to harvest bone marrow, and 
this is commodification. Finally, it is pure speculation to suggest 
that the saviour sibling will come to agree with the procedure in 
the future - substituted judgment is not an acceptable form of con-
sent in either UK or US family law. It is of course understandable 
that desperate parents may make these kinds of pleas in order to 
save the life of their sick child,  but the legal autonomy of the sav-
iour sibling outweighs the plight of the sick child. 
Opponents of PTT focus on the conflicts faced by parents (Gre-
wal):
Even when parents love and cherish the donor child, there are con-
cerns regarding the level of risk potentially placed on the donor 
[child]…parents may be faced with a decision about a bone mar-
row harvest from the infant in the first months of life, exposing the 
child to procedure-associated risks. At what point would the risk to 
the donor child be ethically unacceptable, and who should decide? 
Parents are conflicted in that they must consider the interests of the 
donor child and the recipient child. A final concern is that some 
couples may use PGD to select a disease-free or an HLA-compat-
ible embryo with the intent to harvest tissue only and not to bring 
another child into the world. This scenario would entail an induced 
abortion at some point during gestation and the collection of [cells] 
from the foetal liver. Although such directed donation of tissue 
from an induced abortion would violate federal law, some couples 
have already enquired about this possibility. 
Additional empirical research by Kalfoglou confirms that some 
fertility patients are “emphatic” that PTT is an inappropriate use of 
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PGD because it “put the second child at too much risk, is unethical, 
and treats him like a junkyard”.  It appears that commentators will 
continue to struggle to find a settled ethical approach to this branch 
of PGD for as long as it is divided between fertility law and dona-
tion law. To put it bluntly, PTT is an off-shoot from PGD  whereby 
a tissue-matching embryo disappears down a gap. So, what does 
the future hold? 
There are two possibilities. Firstly, the group of recipients may 
expand to include parents. Commentators are vehemently against 
the idea of couples seeking PTT to create a bone marrow donor 
for themselves, but would parents be taking advantage of their 
children any more in a parent-child donation than they would in a 
sibling-sibling donation? The embryo is selected in the same way, 
it is harvested after birth in the same way and it keeps the family 
together in the same way. Some may even argue that a donor child 
would benefit more from a living parent than a living sibling. Sec-
ondly, PTT for kidney donation may become a possibility which is 
currently prohibited in the United Kingdom under section 1ZA(4), 
schedule 2 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. 
There is already substantial case law in the United States regarding 
sibling kidney donations dating back to the 1950’s.  It is likely that 
should the kidney scenario arise in the United Kingdom, the High 
Court would have to confirm the procedure as in the best interests 
of the child - who is paramount under the Children Act 1989 - 
in light of a significant and measurable psychological therapeu-
tic benefit. The younger the child, the less clear the benefit would 
be which, according to Curran v Bosze (1990) 566 N.E.2d 1319, 
should be grounded in the pre-existing relationship between the 
siblings. It is almost impossible to predict how this branch of PGD 
will develop in light of the potential trespass upon the donor child. 
This issue is not considered when he/she is merely a tissue-match-
ing embryo. The difficulty is in encouraging two completely sep-
arate areas of law – fertility and donation – to work together to 
protect the welfare of the resulting child. There is a very real threat 
of criminal and civil action yet remarkably, the creation of saviour 
siblings is probably the most socially acceptable branch of PGD.
Surplus Embryos
The emergence of PGD has triggered accusations of unnecessary 
embryo wastage, especially within the branches of social sex se-
lection and PTT. Unused embryos can of course be frozen, but 
couples who seek only a male embryo or a tissue matching embryo 
may discard embryos that are surplus to requirements despite them 
being perfectly healthy. Should we be concerned about this side 
effect of PGD? 
In the United Kingdom, the Warnock Report (1984) suggested 
that “the embryo of the human species should be afforded some 
protection in law…we do not want to see a situation in which hu-
man embryos are frivolously or unnecessarily used in research”. 
To make good on this promise, the Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Act 1990 was passed and section 3(4) stipulates that the 
preimplanted embryo must be destroyed within fourteen days to 
coincide with the emergence of the primitive streak (a string of 
bumps resembling the spine). In 2012, the UK Health Minister 
Lord Howe revealed that:
• 1.7 million UK embryos created for IVF had been thrown away 
since August 1991;
• 3.5 million embryos had been created but had produced only 
235,480 ‘gestational sacs;
• 840,000 of the 3.5 million embryos were in storage for future 
use;
• 2000 of the embryos were stored for donation;
• 5,900 embryos were set aside for scientific research;
• 1.4 million embryos were implanted but fewer than one in six 
resulted in a pregnancy;
• 23,480 embryos were discarded after being removed from stor-
age.
As a result of these figures, Lord Alton, a Crossbench peer, an-
nounced that “embryos were being created and thrown away in 
industrial numbers”. 
In the United States, there is no clear legal guidance on the sta-
tus of the embryo except to say that after an elapse of time they 
are treated as abandoned. The Ethics Committee of the American 
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) has published an 
opinion on the status of abandoned embryos (which are described 
as ignored or rejected embryos) and it states that 4% of approx-
imately 400,000 embryos were in storage because: contact with 
the patients had been lost, the embryos had been abandoned, the 
patient had died, the embryos were awaiting shipment, the patients 
were undecided about transfer to another State, the embryos were 
awaiting a decision, the embryos were to be donated to research 
or another couple, the embryos were reserved for embryology 
training, wishes were not specified on the permit, the patients were 
divorcing, or the embryos were awaiting long-term storage.  The 
ASRM recommends (in light of the vague legal position) that clin-
ics should ask each couple contemplating embryo storage to give 
written instructions concerning disposition of embryos in the event 
of death, divorce, separation, failure to pay charges or disagree-
ment, and that five years is long enough to store embryos if efforts 
have been made to contact the couple and they have left no direc-
tions on disposition.  
Commentators have handled the destruction of embryos following 
PGD in different ways.  In support of PGD, Dunstan makes a com-
parison to nature:
The leading fact is that nature itself discards spontaneously some 
of its defective products. Unfortunately, being as uncertain in its 
calculations as we are, if not more so, it does not discard them 
all. Neither is there, beyond a certain point, any exemplary scale 
in what it discards: some of those which it spares are among the 
most gravely handicapped. Furthermore (except in conditions fatal 
before puberty) nature seems not to check the descent of defective 
genes from generation to generation, which is one of the goals 
(with recognised limitations) of medical genetics. 
It is thought that the destruction of an embryo after genetic screen-
ing is far less objectionable than the destruction of an established 
pregnancy after prenatal genetic diagnosis.  Boyle and Savulescu 
refer directly to the social termination of pregnancy in their sup-
port of PGD:
UK legislation allows embryos to be destroyed [upon] 14 days 
of age. To prohibit couples from rejecting healthy but unwanted 
embryos in a society that condones the destruction of hundreds 
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of thousands of healthy but unwanted foetuses would be wildly 
inconsistent. Moreover, couples should be encouraged to donate 
their healthy but unwanted embryos to other couples who cannot 
conceive. 
Boyle and Savulescu raise an interesting point: statistics from the 
Department of Health in the United Kingdom state that in 2015 
there were 191,014 abortions in England and Wales, 181,231 of 
which were under section 1(1)(a) of the Abortion Act 1967 (the 
‘social’ ground).  It is difficult to argue for the legal protection 
of embryos when the social destruction of pregnancies is autho-
rised by law, but should not PGD by its very nature be expected to 
create life as opposed to contributing to the discarding of healthy 
embryos for purely social reasons, thereby diminishing its role to 
a  ‘sorting system’?
It is perhaps inevitable that thousands of healthy embryos will be 
discarded by fertility clinics in light of the tradition to create more 
embryos than are needed, but perhaps the reasons for discarding 
healthy embryos can be altered to show the respect first suggested 
by the Warnock Report (1984)? For example, unwanted embryos 
following PGD  could be donated to research to ensure that the 
embryos are not completely ‘wasted’. This could also help with 
future genetic treatments. 
Adult-Onset Diseases
The newest development in PGD, and one of the most topical  is 
the screening of embryos for the BRCA1, BRCA2 or HNPCC 
gene (a predisposition to cancer).  The BRCA gene was first dis-
covered by the University of California, Berkeley in 1990 and can 
be screened in both embryos and adults.  The most recent statistics 
in the United Kingdom are as follows:
• BRCA1 and BRCA2 mutations account for 25% of hereditary 
breast cancers, 10% of all breast cancers and 15% of ovarian can-
cers;
• 12% of women will develop breast cancer but with the BRCA1 
gene this rises to 80% and with the BRCA2 gene it rises to 45%;
•1.3% of women will develop ovarian cancer but with the BRCA1 
gene it rises to 40% and with the BRCA2 gene it rises to 17%;
• Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2 also increase the risk of fal-
lopian tube cancer, peritoneal cancer, prostate cancer, pancreatic 
cancer and Fanconi anaemia subtype;
• Individuals with the Hereditary Non-Polyposis Colorectal Can-
cer (HNPCC) gene have up to an 80% lifetime risk of colorectal 
cancer and up to a 60% risk of uterine cancer as well as other 
gastrointestinal cancers. 
This branch of PGD is unique in that a middle-aged woman who 
has a history of breast cancer in her family (or even if she does 
not) can purchase a home DNA test to reveal whether she carries 
the BRCA gene, leaving her in a difficult position if she receives 
a positive result.  Does she simply wait for the cancer to occur (if 
at all), or does she have preventative surgery before the cancer is 
diagnosed? Adult screening is outside the ambit of this article, but 
it should be noted that academic commentary is building on this 
controversial issue.
In the United Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryolo-
gy Authority launched a consultation document entitled, Choices 
& Boundaries (2005) to garner public and professional opinion 
as to whether the BRCA gene should be included in PGD.  The 
crux of the controversy was that most genetic diseases licenced 
to be screened have a very high penetrance risk (90% or above, 
such as Huntington’s disease) making the likelihood of disability 
or death almost certain. BRCA and HNPCC are low penetrance 
genes (30% - 80%) meaning that the embryo may live five decades 
before being struck  with cancer (if at all). Additionally, cancer can 
be treated effectively in a lot of cases meaning that the embryo 
could enjoy a perfectly healthy life. The results of the consulta-
tion were published in the Choice & Boundaries Report (2006) 
and inevitably showed a mixed response. Some individuals with 
a family history of cancer did not wish to pass the BRCA gene 
onto their children because of the upheaval that a diagnosis could 
bring.  Other individuals could not decide where the line was to be 
drawn regarding penetrance, and feared a floodgate into learning 
difficulties. The ultimate decision by the HFE Authority, despite 
the mixed responses in the consultation, was as follows:
Taking into account the range of views expressed in the public 
discussion and the recommendations of the Ethics and Law Com-
mittee, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority be-
lieves that, in principle, it is appropriate that PGD be available 
for serious, lower penetrance, later-onset genetic disorders such as 
inherited breast, bowel and ovarian cancer. 
In the United States, the American Society for Reproductive Medi-
cine published a Committee Opinion and came to a similar conclu-
sion that PGD for adult-onset genetic diseases should be available 
to couples seeking fertility treatment as long as a genetic counsel-
lor is there to advise the couple for the following reasons:
Arguments offered in support of PGD for serious adult-onset con-
ditions include the right to reproductive choice on the part of per-
sons who seek to bear children, the medical good of preventing 
the transmission of genetic disorders, and potential social benefits 
of reducing the overall burden of disease. Arguments advanced 
against the use of PGD include expense, the questionable value 
of the medical benefits obtained in light of our inability to predict 
medical progress over the longer term, the possibility of misdi-
agnosis, and the unknown risks of the procedure…a woman who 
carries the BRCA1 gene has an increased risk for the development 
of breast and ovarian cancer but may never develop cancer for 
reasons that are not yet understood. Critics of PGD also argue that 
utilizing the procedure for embryo selection risks devaluing cer-
tain lives. 
A particularly upsetting consequence of screening embryos for 
BRCA1 that is not mentioned by the ASRM is the shock to the 
mother (or father) upon learning that they carry the gene too. Most 
couples seeking PGD probably already know they suffer from or 
carry a particular genetic disorder, but some do not. To learn that 
their risk of cancer has shot up from 12% to 80% may cause psy-
chological harm. This issue is yet to be canvassed by researchers.
Commentators have made an interesting observation: if a woman 
already knows she carries the BRCA1, BRCA2 or HNPCC gene, 
or has some other adult-onset condition such as early-onset Alz-
heimer’s Disease, should she seek fertility treatment to start a fam-
ily knowing that she may not see her child grow up, or that her 
child will become her carer within a few short years? Robertson 
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argues that parents should not be condemned for seeking fertility 
treatment in these circumstances because the surviving parent will 
be there to offer the grieving child support, and any psychologi-
cal trauma caused to the child will not fill his/her life with such 
grief that it would be harmful for him/her to be born.  This argu-
ment, however, may be viewed as irresponsible. Robertson may be 
placing the desires of the parents before the welfare of the child. 
The death of a parent in childhood would almost certainly cause 
psychological harm. There is also no guarantee that the father 
would be able to cope in the midst of losing his wife. The mother 
is prima facie giving birth to her own carer. Is this a unique form 
of slavery? It is understandable that a dying woman may wish to 
experience childbirth and parenthood before her untimely death 
from an adult-onset genetic disease but it is not an ‘entitlement’ 
in law or otherwise, and her desire should not override the right 
of the prospective child to live an open life without the infliction 
of pathological grief at a young age.   The future in this branch of 
PGD is uncertain. It is unlikely that the HFE Authority (UK) or the 
ASRM (US) will refuse to treat patients with genetic diseases for 
fear of discriminating against disabilities, leaving children to be 
born into unwell and (sometimes) dying families. This branch of 
PGD carries the most moral strain, as it would be deemed unfair – 
but not illegal – to intentionally bring a child into such traumatic 
circumstances.
Conclusion
The unique branches of PGD that have developed over the last 25 
years - sex selection, eugenics, screening for a disability, saviour 
siblings and adult-onset diseases - have brought multiple contro-
versies to the practice of fertility treatment. Fertility is such a deep-
ly personal issue that there are not likely to be any settled answers 
as to where the line should be drawn. The Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority in its Choices & Boundaries Report (2006) 
asked the public what they thought about PGD and some did not 
like the idea of screening embryos for any type of genetic disorder:
“Specific learning difficulties like Asperger’s, dyspraxia, dyslexia, 
ADHD, etc., could be future candidates for PGD. This would be 
highly undesirable. It would look like eugenics or social engineer-
ing.”
“PGD should not be used to test for any condition. Screening em-
bryos, with a view to destroying, if certain criteria are not fulfilled, 
should not be carried out, as it is eugenic in nature.” 
The anxiety felt by the public may be the result of ignorance, the 
ghost of Nazism eugenics, the potential floodgate into learning 
difficulties, the idea of targeting disabilities, or the notion of re-
moving the element of surprise from birth. The technology is  in 
a strange position in that it encourages  the destruction of an in-
creased number of healthy embryos  whilst helping to establish 
an increased number of healthy pregnancies. Can the public trust 
PGD if it plays such a contentious role? 
PGD as part of routine fertility treatment is harmless: it simply 
ensures that a healthy embryo is selected. It is the non-medical 
branches of PGD, such as social sex selection, tissue matching and 
negative dysgenics that should be monitored over the next quarter 
of a century for unexpected developments. This is where a rising 
conflict between the reproductive autonomy of the parents and the 
right of the child to an open future can be found. These growing 
branches of  assisted reproductive technology are being imple-
mented by parents to meet their own ends (the embryos are  not 
‘designed’ but they are selected for implantation in line with per-
sonal designs) and they may lead to criminal and civil test cases by 
the ‘screened’ child should a causal link to harm or loss be proven. 
In the event that genes for learning difficulties, metabolism or in-
telligence are found in the near future, the ethical discussions sur-
rounding PGD would quickly intensify on an international scale.
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